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MILITARY PENSIONS AS DIVISIBLE ASSETS:
THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER
SPOUSES' PROTECTION ACT
Nancy R. Hauserman*
Carol C. Fethke **
INTRODUCTION
One of America's fastest growing means of saving in recent years
has been the accumulation of pension or retirement benefits.' As ac-
crued benefits have become a significant share of family savings,
couples facing divorce have found the legal question of the divisibility
of benefits in a property settlement an important economic issue.
Within the past two years, both the United States Supreme Court2 and
the Congress3 have addressed the issue of divisibility of pension bene-
fits within the context of federal military retirement pay. Since most
states do not distinguish military retirement benefits from similar bene-
fits derived from other public or private pension plans, the actions of
the Supreme Court and Congress have important and potentially far-
reaching consequences.
The military retirement pay system is a noncontributory pension
program.4 A regular or reserve commissioned officer who has served
twenty years in the armed services, of which at least ten years were on
active duty, is entitled to benefits upon retirement.5 Benefit payments
are based upon length of service and military rank,6 are adjusted for
changes in the Consumer Price Index,7 and are taxable to the recipient
* Associate Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Iowa; B.A., Univer-
sity of Rhode Island, 1971; J.D., University of Iowa Law School, 1976.
* Associate Professor, College of Liberal Arts, University of Iowa; A.B., Wellesley College,
1964; Ph. D., University of Iowa, 1971.
1. For example, in 1960, 1,780,000 individuals were covered by private pensions which paid out
$1,720,000,000.00 in pension benefits. By 1970, 4,720,000 individuals were covered by pri-
vate pensions which paid out $7,360,000,000.00 in benefits. W. GREENOUGH & F. KING,
PENSIONS PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 110 (1976) (quoting KOLODRUBETZ, Two Decades of
Employee-Benefit Plans, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 35 (1972)).
2. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
3. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H5957-59 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1982) (to be codified at scattered sections
of 10 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Act].
4. See Preliminary Review ofMilitary Retirement Systems: Hearings before the Military Compen-
sation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 95th Cong., ist and 2d Sess.,
5 (1977-78) (statement of Col. Leon S. Hirsh, Jr., USAF, Director of Compensation, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Military Retirement Hearings].
5. 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (1976).
6. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3929, 3991 (1976).
7. 10 U.S.C. § 1401(A) (1976).
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as ordinary income. 8 Military retirement pay terminates upon the re-
tired service member's death.9 However, the recipient may designate a
beneficiary for any amounts due but not yet paid, or may arrange for
an annuity for designated survivors by electing reduced payments.' 0
In McCarty v. McCarty," the Supreme Court held that military re-
tirement benefits are not subject to division in divorce actions because
division would cause clear and substantial damage to important federal
interests.' 2 The Supreme Court's decision in the McCarty case
prompted Congress to pass the Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act (Act).' 3 Declaring military retirement pay to be a po-
tentially divisible asset for property settlement in divorce,' 4 the Act
overruled the McCarty decision and returned the issue to the states.' 5
The Act has been called the most significant piece of legislation benefit-
ting women to come out of the 97th Congress.' 6 First introduced in the
House of Representatives by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), ' 7 and
later sponsored in the Senate by Sen. Roger Jepsen (R-lowa),' 8 Chair-
man of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Man-
power and Personnel, the bill became law on February 1, 1983.'"
This article will begin with an analysis of the McCarty decision. It
will then examine the major provisions of the Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act. Of special concern will be the scope of
the Act and its impact upon military families. This analysis will also
address the potential economic implications of the Act. In addition, it
will illustrate how the presence of pensions affects the level of family
savings and how the Act may result in disparity in property distribu-
tions to husbands and wives, depending upon their state of residence
when they file the dissolution petition. Finally, this article will address
the conflicting legal issues left unresolved in the wake of McCarty and
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act.
McCarty v. McCarty
On March 26, 1981, the United States Supreme Court heard argu-
ments on the issue of military retirement pay as a divisible community
asset for purposes of property settlement upon divorce.2 0 The Court's
8. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(l1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
9. 453 U.S. at 215.
10. 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1976).
11. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
12. Id. at 232.
13. Supra note 3.
14. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)).
15. Id.
16. Des Moines Reg., Sept. 11, 1982, at 10A, Col. 3.
17. H.R. 2817, 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 28,294 (March 13, 1979).
18. S. 1814, 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 14,231 (Nov. 4, 1981).
19. Act, supra note 3.
20. 453 U.S. 210.
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holding in McCarty v. McCarty firmly established military pensions as
separate, non-divisible property.
In 1976, after nineteen years of marriage, Dr. Richard McCarty
filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage in the Superior Court
of California. Dr. McCarty had married his wife, Patricia, while he
was a second year medical student. In his fourth year of medical
school, Dr. McCarty went on active duty in the United States Army.
Eighteen years later, when the petition for dissolution was filed, Dr.
McCarty held the rank of colonel.
At the time of the McCarty decision, California law treated pension
rights as divisible property even if not vested at the time of the dissolu-
tion of the marriage.2" The California Superior Court held that Dr.
McCarty's military pension was quasi-community property and or-
dered him to pay his wife a specified portion.22 The California Court
of Appeals affirmed the award. Dr. McCarty's subsequent petition to
the California Supreme Court was denied.23
On certiorari, the issue presented to the United States Supreme
Court was "whether, upon the dissolution of a marriage, federal law
precludes a state court from dividing military nondisability retired pay
pursuant to state community property laws."24 The Court held that
federal law did preclude such division.
The Court began its analysis by noting that "[sitate family and fam-
ily-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' fed-
eral interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law
be overriden."25  Citing its earlier decision in Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo,26 the Court stated that the preemption test is "whether the
right as asserted conflicts with the express terms of federal law and
whether its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal
program to require nonrecognition. ' '27  The Court then applied this
test to determine whether Mrs. McCarty's state-designated right to a
share of her ex-husband's military pension negatively and materially
affected existing federal law. Such an effect would preclude recogni-
tion or adherence to the state right. 8
21. See, In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561 (1976).
22. Appellant's Opening Brief at 45, McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
23. App. to Juris. Statement 83, McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (noting the California
Supreme Court's denial of cert.).
24. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 211 (1981).
25. Id. at 220 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)).
26. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
27. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 221 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 583).
28. The Court began by distinguishing retired military pension benefits from other types of pen-
sions, noting that "It]he retired officer remains a member of the Army... " McCarty, 453
U.S. at 221. In addition, the Court found that the retired officer "remains subject to recall to
active duty by the Secretary of the Army 'at any time.'" Id. at 222. Consequently, the Court
concluded that "military retired pay is reduced compensation for reduced current services."
Id. While the Court offered this characterization of retired military pensions, it nevertheless
proceeded to reason that such a characterization was not central to its holding. Instead, the
Court continued, "[w]e agree with appellant's alternative argument that the application of
1984]
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The Supreme Court concluded that California's community prop-
erty law did conflict with existing federal law. The Court's conclusion
was based on its finding that the pertinent California law29 neither de-
fined, classified, nor discussed the scope of the pension's entitlement.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with an historical examina-
tion of various legislative schemes enacted to ensure military retire-
ment payments and to allow the retiring officer to provide for survivors.
The Court found that these developments indicated that military
nondisability pension pay to the retiree is of a personal nature and
therefore not subject to division in divorce.
Similarly, the Court noted that on several occasions, Congress had
not availed itself of opportunities to specify an ex-spouse as a person
entitled to military retirement funds.30 The Court viewed Congress'
failure to specify an entitlement for any person other than the retired
officer as indicating legislative intent not to recognize any other lawful
claim. Distinguishing its earlier holding in Hisquierdo,31 which in-
volved spousal entitlement to an annuity created under the Railroad
Retirement Act, the Court noted the absence of any language, such as
is found in the Railroad Retirement Act, which would create an entitle-
ment or permit a separate annuity for the retired member's spouse.32
The Supreme Court bolstered its conclusion through an analysis of
the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan (RSFPP)3 3 and the
Survivor's Benefit Plan (SBP). 34 Under these plans, "the service mem-
ber is free to elect to provide no annuity at all, or to provide an annuity
payable only to the surviving children, and not to the spouse."3 5 Under
either plan, the service member may designate a beneficiary of an an-
nuity and not provide for the spouse. The Court reasoned that if retire-
community property law conflicts with the federal military retirement scheme regardless of
whether retired pay is defined as current or as deferred compensation." Id. at 223.
While the distinction between compensation for current services and compensation for
past services was ultimately not important in McCarty because of the preemption issue, this
distinction could be determinative in other situations. Generally, current compensation is
not viewed as a divisible asset for property settlement purposes while compensation for past
services (Ze., pensions) may be divisible depending upon state law.
29. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5118, 5119 (West 1970 and Supp. 1981).
30. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 224-32 (1981).
31. 439 U.S. 572. The Supreme Court held that the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 prohibits
the allocation and division of retirement benefits for railroad employees for purposes of
property settlement in divorce. The Court rejected the holding of the California Supreme
Court that the benefits were divisible because their eventual receipt was based on work done
at least in part during the marriage. The Court noted that railroad retirement benefits are
not contractual and could be changed by Congress at any time. Furthermore, the Railroad
Retirement Act specifically provides for a spousal benefit which ceases on divorce. The
Court also emphasized the strong anti-attachment provisions of the Railroad Act which evi-
dence congressional intent to guarantee the railroad employee full entitlement to retirement
benefits.
32. McCartiy, 453 U.S. at 224.
33. Id. at 215-16, 226-30 (discussing the Retired Servicemen's Family Protection Plan, 10 U.S.C.§§ 1431-1446 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
34. 453 U.S. at 215-16, 226-30 (discussing the Survivor Benefit Plan, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
35. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226.
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ment pay and any annuity that might flow therefrom was considered
community property, the service member's spouse would automatically
have rights to one-half of the annuity, thus rendering the designation
provision meaningless.
The Supreme Court noted that the "personal entitlement" concept
was necessary to avoid an outcome which would "have the anomalous
effect of placing an ex-spouse in a better position than that of a wid-
ower or a widow under the RSFPP and the SBP. '36 The Court sug-
gested that this outcome could result in a situation where, upon
divorce, the nonmilitary spouse would be awarded an immediate sum
certain to offset the future pension receipt awarded the service member.
Presumably, this offsetting amount would be the property of the non-
military spouse from the date of the decree. On the other hand, since
military pension benefits cease upon the death of the service member,
the surviving spouse would not have the protection of this present value
received for future income.37
Lastly, the Court pointed to the rejection of a proposed provision of
the SBP which "would have allowed attachment of up to 50% of mili-
tary retired pay to comply with a court order in favor of a spouse, for-
mer spouse, or child."38 This provision was excluded from the bill's
final draft.39
Once the Court determined that the personal entitlement concept
created a conflict between congressional intent and state community
property rights, it turned to the question of "whether the 'consequences
[of that community property right] sufficiently injure the objectives of
the federal program to require nonrecognition."'  The Court noted:
"[flrom its inception, the military nondisability retirement system has
been 'as much a personnel management tool as an income maintenance
method.' "41 The Court concluded that an injury did exist, basing its
decision on four considerations. First, any community property inter-
est which Mrs. McCarty might claim would necessarily decrease the
amount of the benefit intended solely for the retiree.' Second, any
community property division, or potential for division, might undercut
the various plans which "Congress has devised to encourage a service
member to set aside a portion of his or her retired pay as an annuity for
a surviving spouse or dependent children. '4 3 Third, if the value of re-
36. Id. at 227.
37. See infra note 42 and accompanying text for a discussion of this concern as a continuing
issue.
38. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 229.
39. Id. at 229, 231.
40. Id. at 232 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581-83).
41. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 212-13.
42. This argument seemed to follow naturally from the Court's earlier discussion and conclusion
about the pension as a personal entitlement. Obviously, if a spouse could make a valid claim
for some share of the benefit, the retiree would not be the sole beneficiary. Id. at 233.
43. If a service member had to consider the possibility that he or she might be forced to contrib-
ute retirement pay to a community property settlement, he or she might be reluctant to
pledge any of the sum as an annuity fund now. This reluctance might adversely affect sur-
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tired pay was, as the Court posited, intended as an inducement for en-
listment or reenlistment," the service member must be able to count on
receipt of the pay.45 Lastly, the Court reasoned that inclusion of mili-
tary retirement pension benefits as community property would directly
and adversely affect "the goals of encouraging orderly promotion and a
youthful military."'
In concluding its opinion, the Court called upon Congress to clarify
its intent if indeed the McCarty holding did not correctly reflect it. Cit-
ing the deference accorded to congressional authority in the military
area, the Court suggested it had attempted only to interpret congres-
sional intent. The Court concluded succinctly that whether the former
spouse's plight warranted more attention or protection was a "decision
. . . for Congress alone."47
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, chided the majority for
failing to correctly "quote or cite the test for preemption which His-
quierdo established." 8 He concluded that the Hisquierdo Court had
reiterated its reluctance to become involved in questions of marriage
law stating that "[o]n the rare occasion where state family law has come
into conflict with the federal statute, this Court has limited review
under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has
'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-
empted."49 Justice Rehnquist argued in McCarty that the majority
cited no "direct enactment" which preempts the California community
property law. He suggested that, at best, the majority used an indirect
approach by relying on silence to imply legislative intent.50 He con-
cluded, therefore, that the federal law should not be found to preempt
the state law at issue.
Additionally, Justice Rehnquist noted that while the majority pro-
vided an analysis of laws and legislative history, it did so only in regard
to laws and legislation not directly related to the case at bar.5' In partic-
ular, he criticized the comparison of legislation dealing with alimony
and child support to McCarty, a case dealing with a property settle-
ment. As he noted, these are distinct rights, and the garnishment issue,
which is often raised in alimony or child support cases, was not raised
viving heirs of the service member, a consequence which the Court reasoned Congress had
sought to avoid by the passage of the various annuity plans. Id.
44. Id. at 234.
45. So, the argument continued, if the service member was divorced while living in a state which
regarded the value of the pension as a community asset for purposes of the property settle-
ment, the member or potential service member might seriously reconsider whether to re-
enlist. Id.
46. Id. at 235. Interestingly, this same argument was raised in Hisquierdo where the Court noted
that a purpose of the railroad retirement benefits was to "assure more rapid advancement in
the service and also more jobs for younger workers." 439 U.S. at 573-74.
47. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 236.
48. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 236 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
50. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 236, 237.
51. Id. at 237.
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in McCary.52
Post-McCarty Decisions
Following the decision in McCarty, numerous litigants sought re-
view of divorce awards dividing retirement pay as part of a property
settlement. The cases were generally. decided on two issues: (1) the
finality of the divorce decree, and (2) the retroactivity of McCarty.
In Ex parte Welch," the Texas Court of Appeals refused to apply
McCarty retroactively and upheld a division of military nondisability
retirement pay. Relying on McCarty, Mr. Welch stopped payments of
his military retirement benefits to his wife as ordered in a decree of
divorce. The district court found Mr. Welch in contempt of court and
jailed him. On appeal, Mr. Welch argued the Texas community prop-
erty laws were expressly preempted by federal statutes on military
nondisability retirement pay; consequently, the pre-McCarty decree
was void. However, the court of appeals held that the decree ordering
the division of a military pension was neither void nor subject to collat-
eral attack and remanded Mr. Welch to the sheriffs custody.54 In so
holding, the court of appeals noted that McCarty would be applied ret-
52. Id. This argument is certainly consistent with the decisions of several state courts which hold
that while military pensions may not be distributed as part of a property settlement, they
may be valued for purposes of ability to pay alimony or child support. See infra notes 122
and 123 and accompanying text. It is important to distinguish, as the Court in Hisquierdo
did, a property settlement from alimony or child support. Congress amended the Social
Security Act in 1975 to provide for attachment of federal benefits in order to meet legal
obligations of child support or alimony. Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2357 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)). The provisions state:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the
entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or paya-
ble by, the United States (including any agency or instrumentality thereof and any
wholly owned Federal corporation) to any individual, including members of the
armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United
States were a private person, to legal process brought for enforcement, against such
individual of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony
payments.
42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
A 1977 Social Security Act provision defined "alimony" and carefully distinguished it
from payments under a property settlement. Act of May 23, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30,
§ 462(c), 91 Stat. 116, 160 (1977). This Act specifically states that alimony "does not include
any payment or transfer of property or its value by an individual to his spouse or former
spouse in compliance with any community property settlement, equitable distribution of
property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses."
In sum, the Court in Hfisquierdo found that to the extent that California's community
property laws would divide railroad retirement benefits, they materially conflicted with the
purpose of the Federal Railroad Retirement Act and so could not be enforced. In His-
quierdo, as in McCarty, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that there was an
insufficient showing that state law conflicted with federal law.
Indeed, the federal 'policies' the Court perceives amount to little more than the com-
monplace that retirement benefits are designed to provide an income on retirement to
the employee. There is simply nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress meant to
insulate these pension benefits from the rules of ownership that in California are a
normal incident of marriage.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 591.
53. 633 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
54. Id. at 693.
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roactively only to cases in which judgments were pending at the time of
the McCarty decision. The court cited the earlier Fifth Circuit opinion
in Erspan v. Bodgett55 in support of this distinction. The court in Er-
span found that:
[t]he res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the
merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been
wrong or rested upon a legal principle subsequently overruled in an-
other case. . . . Nothing in McCarty suggests that the Supreme Court
therein intended to invalidate, or otherwise render unenforceable,
prior valid and subsisting state court judgments. Absent some indica-
tion of such an intent, we decline to do so.56
Interestingly, the court cited the dissent in McCarty in support of its
refusal to retroactively apply McCarty, stating: "Congress did not 'pos-
itively require by direct enactment' that our state community property
laws be preempted as to the military nondisability retired pay."
57
In contrast to Ex parte Welch, the Arizona Appellate Court re-
versed a lower court award of an interest in future military retirement
pay. In Sandoval v. Sandoval,58 the Yuma County Superior Court had
awarded Mrs. Sandoval a proportionate interest in her former spouse's
military retirement income, based on a petition of modification of the
original decree.59 However, the Arizona Appellate Court concluded
that "McCarty . . . has effectively overruled the holdings of our
supreme court . . . and that portion of the order of the trial court re-
garding retirement benefits must be reversed."6 While the court did
not explicitly distinguish this case based on the modification of the
original decree, a concurring opinion notes that such questions regard-
ing the propriety of McCarty application "will of necessity have to pro-
ceed on a case-by-case basis ... "61
Finally, Wintriss v. Superior Court62 raised the post-McCarty divisi-
bility issue at another procedural juncture. Wintriss also involved a
trial court award of military retirement pay to the non-member spouse.
However, "the trial court characterized the pension payments as com-
munity property but reservedjurisdiction to characterize the pension plan
!f the law changed."63 While the issue of divisibility was heavily liti-
55. 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 28 (quoting in part Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)).
57. Welch, 633 S.W.2d at 693.
58. 634 P.2d 405 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
59. Id. at 405. On January 17, 1977, the decree of dissolution was granted. The property settle-
ment therein did not mention the military retirement pay. In December 1978, Mrs. Sandoval
filed a petition for modification from which the subsequent appeal was taken.
60. Id. at 406.
61. Id. (Conteras, J., concurring).
62. No. 26537, slip. op. (Cal. Ct. App. May 19, 1982).
63. Id. at 696 (emphasis added). The actual language in the decree read "that as to the military
retired pay of petitioner. . . jurisdiction is reserved to divide or find them to be the separate
property of one or the other party in light of later decisional or statutory law." Id. The Court
also noted that Mr. Wintriss relied on the reservation of jurisdiction to preserve his right to
later challenge the division if the law was ultimately changed. Id.
[Vol. 11:27
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gated at the trial level, neither party appealed the trial court's reserva-
tion of jurisdiction. 64
Following McCarty, Mr. Wintriss moved the trial court to discon-
tinue the division of his military retirement pay. The trial court not
only declined to order the requested modification but ruled that its ear-
lier reservation of jurisdiction was "void as an act in excess of the juris-
diction of the Court. ' 65 The trial court reasoned that "public policy
requires finality of judgments" and declined Mr. Wintriss' motion.
Neither party appealed the trial court's refusal to reopen the pension
issue, but the appellate court issued an alternate writ of mandamus to
facilitate a speedy resolution. According to the court of appeals,
[o]nce a military retirement pension has been classified as community
property, it can not be reclassified as separate if (1) the judgment be-
came final before McCarty or (2) was then pending on an appeal which
did not challenge the characterization (In re Marriage of Sheldon
(1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 371 (177 Cal. Rptr. 380)), or (3) if the parties
stipulated to the community property characterization in the trial court
(In re Marriage of Mahone (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 17 (176 Cal. Rptr.
274)).66
In Wintriss, there was no stipulation or final classification of the
pension as community property. Therefore, the appellate court rea-
soned, the issue was still open for redetermination. As the court noted,
had either party taken an appeal from the reservation clause in the
initial decree, the divisibility issue would have been finalized. The
court concluded that Mr. Wintriss was now entitled to have the pension
classified and remanded the question to the superior court for its judg-
ment (presumably to be in accord with McCarty).67
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act amends
section 2(a) of chapter 71 of title 1068 of the United States Code. The
Act provides that, "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay
payable to a member [of the military] for periods beginning on or after
June 25, 198 1, either as property solely of the member or as property of
the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdic-
tion of such court."' 69 The Act effectively overrules McCarty by specifi-
cally declaring that military pensions may be considered joint assets for
the purpose of property division in a divorce proceeding. However, the
Act clearly intends that while such pensions may be viewed as commu-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Several other cases have raised the retroactivity issue. See, e.g., Erbe v. Eady, 406 So. 2d 936
(Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
68. Act, supra note 3 (amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1406 (1979)).
69. Act, supra note 3 § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(6)(C)(1)).
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nity property,7° "this section does not create any right, title or interest
which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (in-
cluding by inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse.' 7  Declaring
military retirement pensions as potentially divisible community prop-
erty, the Act then delineates limits on the division of such benefits and
the manner in which they may be divided.7 2
The Act begins with a series of definitions, several of which are es-
pecially pertinent. "Court order" includes decrees for child support
payment, alimony payment, and property division, provided that such
an order defines payment in terms of a dollar amount or as a percent-
age of disposable retired or retainer pay.73 The Act defines "disposable
retired or retainer pay" as "the total monthly retired or retainer pay to
which a member is entitled, ' 74 less amounts due and owing to specified
obligors. In addition to listing the usual armed forces pay deductions, 75
this section includes payments to obligors which "are deducted because
of an election under chapter 73 of this title to provide an annuity to a
spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such mem-
ber's retired or retainer pay is being made pursuant to a court order
under this section. 76
Section (c)(4) of the Act establishes a jurisdictional limit on treating
disposable military retirement pay as a community asset. This section
prohibits a court from classifying and dividing military retirement pay,
"unless the court has jurisdiction over the members by reason of (A) his
residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court. 77 This
section may reflect an attempt to avoid McCarty's criticism that mili-
tary members generally have little control over where they are sta-
tioned, thereby subjecting their retirement pay to division because the
service member was stationed in a state recognizing pensions as marital
property. Under the Act, it is possible for a service member retaining
domicile in a state not recognizing military retirement pay as a marital
asset to avoid division of the military pension. However, the Act per-
mits a service member to consent to jurisdiction in the state in which
the member is stationed.78
70. Id.
71. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(6)(C)(2)).
72. Notably, the Act does not mandate any minimum length of a marriage before the pension
may be considered community or joint property. The House amendment included a caveat
that would have limited consideration of military retirement pay as community divisible
property only "if the marriage lasted 10 years while the service member was performing
creditable service." 128 CONG. REC. H5999 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1982). This amendment was
deleted by the conferees.
73. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2)(C)).
74. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)).
75. .d. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)-(D)).
76. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(3)(F)).
77. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)) (emphasis added).
78. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(C)). The Act's garnishment procedure is specifi-
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Under the Act, the maximum amount available for distribution in a
divorce action shall not exceed fifty percent of the net pension benefit.7 9
With this provision, the Act also provides for the situation involving
more than one person (spouse or former spouse) with a court ordered
entitlement to the retirement pay. In section (e)(2), the Act provides for
a first-come, first-serve system up to the maximum fifty percent avail-
able. In the event of conflicting court orders involving the same par-
ties, the Act provides that payment shall be made in the lesser of the
conflicting amounts (again up to the maximum fifty percent allowable)
with the difference between the highest amount shown in conflicting
court orders and the amount paid, up to the fifty percent maximum,
being withheld."s
While the Act limits the amount of money which may be diverted
from the member's retirement pay, the Act "shall [not] be construed to
relieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support,
or other payments required by a court order .. ." Thus, while the
Act may limit payments from military retirement pay, a creditor can
obtain payment from the member's other available resources or assets.
The Act does not limit the total amount of a service member's indebt-
edness but rather limits collecting indebtness from the service mem-
ber's retirement pay. In this regard, the Act essentially does no more
than most garnishment laws in establishing a collection ceiling. The
clear intent of the Act is to protect retired members from financial
deprivation.
Finally, the Act avoids the retroactivity issues resulting from Mc-
Carty12 by providing the following instruction regarding modification
of court orders finalized before McCarty:
[modifications] should not be recognized if those changes were effected
after the McCarty decision (and before the effective date of the new
title X) to implement the holding in that decision (for example, a modi-
fication setting aside a pre-McCarty division of military retired pay).
•... In other words, the courts should not favorably consider ap-
cally limited to situations where the marriage lasted ten years or more and the service mem-
ber performed at least ten years of creditable service during that time. If either condition is
not met, the military retirement pay may still be considered community property for asset
valuation but will not be subject to division by attachment. While there is some question
whether the duration of a marriage can serve as a basis for federal enforcement remedies,
this restriction is not peculiar to this Act. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2)).
79. Id. (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(l)). It is important to remember that this disposa-
ble retirement pay is the net pay based on the total retirement pay less the initial offsets set
out in § 1408(e)(4)(A)-(F). Section 1408(e)(4)(B) speaks to the total amount of disposable
retirement pay that can be attached under both the Act and section 459 of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) which allows garnishment of the service mem-
ber's retirement pay for purposes of child support and alimony. In sum, the Act provides
that: (1) no more than 50% of the member's disposable retirement pay can be attached under
the Act, regardless of the number of court orders outstanding under the Act; and (2) no more
than 65% of the member's disposable retirement pay can be attached by the total of court
orders under both this Act and the Social Security Act.
80. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) and (e)(3)(B)).
81. Id. § 1002(e)(6) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6)).
82. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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plications based on the enactment of this title to reopen cases finalized
before the McCarty decision wherein military retired pay was not
divided.8 3
By implication, divorces occurring after McCarty (June 26, 1981) may
be reconsidered and division of military retirement pay ordered.
The Act explicitly relieves "[tlhe United States and any officer or
employee" 84 thereof from liability with respect to any payment made
according to legislative prescriptions and includes a provision for noti-
fying any member affected by a court order received under the Act.85
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act adds sev-
eral new paragraphs to the Survivor's Benefit Plan, presumably to re-
flect changes effected by the Act.86 Notably, these amendments include
provisions permitting service members to "provide an annuity to a nat-
ural person with an insurable interest in that person or to provide an
annuity to aformer spouse."87 A married member or a dependent child
may elect to provide an annuity for a former spouse instead of provid-
ing such an annuity to the current spouse or dependent child. This
latter election is permissible only if done "to carry out the terms of a
written agreement entered into voluntarily with a former spouse (with-
out regard to whether such agreement is included in or approved by a
court order)."88 The apparent intent is to allow a service member and
ex-spouse to mutually agree on divorce settlement terms. Presumably,
the annuity might be provided instead of a later reduction in retirement
pay resulting from a division agreement in a property settlement.
The language of the Act does not preclude an ex-spouse from re-
ceiving both a percentage of the member's retirement pay and an annu-
ity under the SBP. Arguably, the biggest problem with this language is
the recognition of a "voluntary written agreement" not necessarily part
of a court order. 89 While the legislature obviously addressed the valid-
ity question by requiring a writing, it is easy to envision myriad ques-
tions and litigation which will arise from enforcing this section.
Potential issues include the voluntariness, legitimacy, or unconsciona-
bility of the agreement. Conceivably, a current spouse might argue
collusion or conspiracy between the spouse and former mate. The lan-
guage contains no terms dictating necessary timing or specifying when
the voluntary agreement may be established. Presumably, a service
member could enter into an agreement with a former spouse even
though one of them had remarried.9"
83. 128 CONG. REC. H5999 - 6000 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1982).
84. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(f)(1)).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 1003(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1447).
87. Id. § 1003(b)(2) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1447) (emphasis added).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. For instance, a service member may prefer to provide an annuity rather than make regular
payments from his or her pay and so might seek to modify a court-ordered periodic, current
payment plan.
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Confronting the possible problems generated by enforcement, sec-
tion 1448(b)(4) of the Act states that if a service member elects to pro-
vide an annuity to a former spouse, the member must provide the
appropriate secretary (of the member's branch of the armed services)
with a written statement at the time of election, signed by the service
member and the member's former spouse.9' This statement must spec-
ify whether the election is made "pursuant to a voluntary written agree-
ment previously entered into by such person as a part of or incident to
a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation,
and if so, whether such voluntary written agreement has been incorpo-
rated in or ratified or approved by a court order."'92 The section offers
some evidence which the Secretary of Defense might use to assess the
election's validity and to resolve future challenges to the election.
However, while this section requires the member to state why the elec-
tion is made, it does not necessarily preclude such an election from
being made under circumstances other than a divorce proceeding.
Section 1450(f)(1) of the Act retains the nonbinding aspect of an
SBP election.93 This section permits a member to revoke an earlier
election and change an annuity in favor of a current spouse or depen-
dent child.94 However, the Secretary must notify the former spouse or
other person to whom the annuity was formerly designated.95 Having
thus allowed the member to change the designation, the section contin-
ues with an interesting caveat. If the annuity provision was made to a
former spouse as part of a voluntary written agreement "incident to a
proceeding of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation,"96
revocation of the election is conditioned by the following:
1) If the election was made pursuant to a stipulation which has been
ratified or incorporated in a court order, then a court-ordered
modification must be produced;97 or
2) If the election was purely voluntary and not court mandated, the
former spouse must provide written acknowledgement of the
change in annuity status.98
Potential litigation involving the issues of fraud and duress from the
latter provision seems certain. Furthermore, an initial election
voluntarily providing an annuity to the former spouse may be effec-
tively irrevocable by the former spouse's refusal to consent to the
change. While this consideration may protect the expectations of the
former spouse, it may also mean fewer elections or more litigation.
Finally, the amendments to the SBP clearly preclude a court-or-
91. Act, supra note 3, § 1003(b)(2) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1447).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 1003(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1450(0(1)).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 1003(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1450(0(2)).
97. Id. § 1003(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(2)(A)).
98. Id. § 1003(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(2)(B)).
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dered annuity. Section 1450(f)(3) provides that "[n]othing in this chap-
ter authorizes any court to order any person to elect. . . to provide an
annuity to a former spouse unless such person has voluntarily agreed in
writing to make such an election."99  The legislature clearly distin-
guished between military retirement pay and a survivor's annuity.
While the former may be ordered divided or attached, the latter, except
to enforce an agreement of the parties, may not.t°°
The concluding sections of the Act amend United States Code pro-
visions relating to medical and dental care of military personnel and
their dependents. °1 Succinctly, the Act ensures that an unremarried
ex-spouse can continue to receive medical and dental care for an ex-
tended time period.' 0 2 An important proviso limits eligibility to mar-
riages which have lasted at least twenty years, during which time the
service member must have performed at least ten years of creditable
service."13 Additionally, an unremarried former spouse may not be
contemporaneously covered under an employer-sponsored health
plan. °4 Lastly, an unremarried former spouse may continue use of the
commissary and the post-exchange. 0 5
THE PENSION ISSUE
McCarty and the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection
Act both address the issue of divisibility of military pension benefits
upon divorce. Controversy involving military pensions forms part of a
broader issue involving division of any pension benefit. Significantly,
while both McCarty 06 and the Act 10 7 specifically refer to military pen-
sion benefits, state courts have not generally regarded military pensions
as substantially different from other forms of retirement compensation
in divorce settlements. Instead, states apply their rules to military and
private pension plans in like manner. Given this compatibility in the
treatment of pension programs, the following discussion focuses on
whether the fifty states permit division of pension benefits in dissolu-
tions. Identifying individual state positions on pension division will
assist in understanding how the Act will affect division of military re-
tirement pay in each state.1
0 8
Generally, a state's divisibility decision is based on one of the three
99. Id. § 1003(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(3)).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 1004(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1005.
106. 453 U.S. at 211.
107. Act, supra note 3.
108. The issue of division under consideration here is not the percentage of property which either
spouse is awarded or is necessarily entitled to, a 50-50 split, or some other measure. Instead,
the central questions are whether the pension can be included in the marital asset pool for
the purpose of determining the total worth of the family's assets and whether the actual
pension payment can be divided or attached.
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following criteria:' °9
(1) Are pension benefits regarded as an expectancy at the time of
divorce?
(2) If the benefits are property, are they separate property?
(3) If the benefits are marital property, is division and distribution of
the pension benefits permissible?
If any of these questions is answered in the affirmative, state courts may
deny inclusion as marital property or division. " io States including pen-
sion benefits in the property division hold that pension benefits are
property," that a portion of the benefit accumulated during the mar-
riage is marital property," 2 and that marital property is divisible.'
Nondivisibility of Benefits
Among states excluding pension benefits from marital assets are
those that consider pension benefits as creating only an expectancy and
not a property right." 4 If pension benefits are adjudged a "mere expec-
tancy," there is no asset existing at the time of divorce which can be
divided. In concluding that pension plans create only expectancies,
many states that equitably distribute marital property have focused on
the idea that retirement programs do not possess recognizable attrib-
utes of property.' 'I Perhaps the clearest illustration of the equity states'
position is presented by the Colorado Court of Appeals in In re Mar-
riage of Ellis."16
Ellis involved the dissolution of a twenty year marriage in which
the husband was already receiving an Army pension. The Court ruled
109. See generally infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981) (accumulation in a
profit-sharing trust arrangement and in a money purchase pension plan belonging to the
husband which can be withdrawn by him at the time of the divorce is "marital property" and
the wife is entitled to her share of her husband's vested interest. But vested pensions or
retirement benefits which are not yet distributable under Arkansas law are not divisible); In
re Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 579 P.2d 613 (1977) (fully vested retirement funds
are marital property divisible upon divorce in accord with Ellis, see infra note 116 and ac-
companying text); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 657 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1983) (pensions acquired
during the marriage, vested or not, may be subject to division upon divorce but a trial court's
award of all of pension to the husband with the wife receiving other equivalent value prop-
erty is not improper).
111. See, e.g., Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973) (pension and/or retirement
benefits characterized as property which must be divided at dissolution).
112. See, e.g., Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981) (pension plan belonging
to husband is part of marital property even if husband can withdraw it at time of divorce).
113. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 579 P.2d 613 (1977) (vested retire-
ment fund is marital property and distributable upon divorce).
114. An expectancy is defined as a future interest over which the holder has no enforceable right.
115. Equitable distribution states ("equity states") do not divide marital property according to a
mandated split (e.g., 50/50) but rather utilize a variety of factors to effect property distribu-
tion. There are approximately forty states which utilize an equitable distribution scheme for
property settlement or, in some instances, only for alimony maintenance. For a complete
listing and discussion, see D. Freed & J. Foster, Family Law In The Fifty Stales. An Overview
As of September 1982, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065, 4079 (Sept. 28, 1982).
116. 96 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975).
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that pension payments to the husband were not property includable
among the couple's marital assets for the following reasons:
1) The employee's right to the benefits was subject to divestment if he
died or was discharged from the Army before twenty years;
2) The amount of the benefit, being wholly within the discretion of
the employer (Congress), was subject to change;
3) The employee made no contribution to the fund; and because the
employer made all contributions, the retirement benefits repre-
sented fully taxable income to the recipient;
4) The benefits never existed as a fixed tangible asset with a lump-
sum value, a cash value, or a surrender, loan redemption value;
and
5) The anticipated retirement benefits could not be attached, gar-
nished, assined, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged prior to
payment. l
At the same time the Colorado Court of Appeals decided Ellis, the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled in White
v. White.. that a pension plan is not subject to equitable distribution
because the entire cost of the benefits of the pension plan was paid by
the employer, the husband had no right of withdrawal, and the hus-
band had not yet complied with the eligibility requirements necessary
to receive a retirement income. The arguments presented in Ellis and
White have in turn been followed by other courts. 1 9
Another major category of states excluding pensions from division
in dissolution cases are common law property, or "title" states.t2 ° Since
117. Id. at 235, 538 P.2d at 1349. It is interesting to note that this language, the essence of which
precludes pension divisibility in Ellis, is set forth as a caveat in the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act which permits such division.
118. 136 N.J. Super. 552, 347 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1976).
119. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975) (military retirement pay is not property
acquired during the marriage for purposes of property division); Feeney v. Feeney, 259 Ark.
858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976) (retirement pay from the armed forces is not personal property
subject to division because it cannot be due and payable, assignable, sold, transferred, con-
veyed or pledged); Parker v. Parker, 227 Ark. 898, 302 S.W.2d 533 (1957) (military retire-
ment pay is not marital property because it is not a fixed tangible asset such as a vested
pension or profit-sharing plan that may be collected as a lump sum, rather it terminates at
death and has no loan, surrender or redemption value); Mueller v. Mueller, 166 N.J. Super.
557, 400 A.2d 136 (1979) (a pension plan is not subject to equitable distribution because it
cannot be withdrawn by the employee until some future time); Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. 645,
421 A.2d 998 (1980) (military retirement pay is not marital property because it has no cash
surrender value).
It should be noted, however, that New Jersey has since rejected the arguments in White
and Mueller and decided that a vested pension plan which provides future benefits is an asset
that results from direct and indirect efforts of both spouses, that the benefits are added pay
for services to the employer, and that since it is acquired during the marriage, it is divisible.
See, e.g., Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 413 A.2d 638 (1980), and Kekkert v. Kekkert,
177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76 (1981).
120. Title states are those states which recognize property held in one name as separate property
and include only jointly held property in the marital assets pool. D. Freed & H. Foster,
supra note 115, at 4079 (Sept. 28, 1982).
In common law property states courts have no general or equitable power to dis-
tribute property upon divorce except jointly-held property, and title alone controls
(subject to constructive trusts and tracing of equitable title, and the law of gifts).
These states are:
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participation in a pension program is established in the employee's
name, any rights flowing from such programs are considered separate
property not part of the marital assets. 2'
Finally, some courts have ruled that pensions are properly includ-
able in the valuation of income and assets used to determine ability to
pay alimony and child support. 122 This distinction is based on the logic
that an immediate division of a pension would decrease the pensioner's
income, threaten the pensioner's economic stability, and thereby lessen
the pensioner's ability to make alimony and child support payments. 23
Divisibility of Benefits
Not all equity states exclude pension benefits from the marital asset
pool. t24 However, inclusion of the pension benefits in the asset pool
depends upon whether the benefit is deemed property rather than a
mere expectancy. Thus, in some states, if any attribute of property is
absent, benefits are characterized as an expectancy, 125 while in other
states, if any attribute of property ispresent, the benefits are character-
ized as property.126  In Pellegrino v. Pellegrino 127 for instance, future
benefits were included as marital property because the wage-earning
1. Mississippi
2. Virginia (after July 1, 1982, Virginia will become an "equitable distribution"
state. See H.B. 691 signed into law).
3. West Virginia
4. South Carolina: Harry Golden, Esq., a leading South Carolina attorney, has
informed us as follows: Although personal property has been subject to equi-
table distribution in this State for some time, real property has traditionally
been distributed on the basis of title with joint property being divided equally;
however, three exceptions to this now exist:
a. A resulting trust may exist in the assets titled in the name of one
spouse where a specific sum at a specific time for a specific price was
paid for real estate by the non-titled spouse.
b. Special equity may exist in cases where a non-titled spouse has made
material contributions of industry and labor during a marriage which
the contributions assist in the acquisition of property in the name of
the other spouse.
c. And, now, the Parrott case (Parrott v. Parrott, S.C. Sup. Ct., filed May
26, 1982) adds a third real estate exception: that a homemaker spouse
may have, upon divorce, an equitable interest in real property ac-
quired by the wage earner spouse in his name when the homemaker
spouse has foregone career opportunities at the behest of the primary
wage earner and throughout a long marriage has remained in the
home to rear children and provide a suitable family environment.
Id.
121. In deciding McCarty, the United States Supreme Court also took the position that military
retirement pay was reduced compensation for reduced services and therefore the separate
property of the service member. However, the Court did not rely on this characterization in
reaching its decision. AMcCarty, 453 U.S. at 223.
122. See, e.g., Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976); Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269
Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980); Baker v. Baker, 120 N.H. 645, 421 A.2d 998 (1980).
123. See, e.g., Holeman v. Holeman, 459 P.2d 611 (Okla. 1969); Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325
(Okla. 1975).
124. See supra notes 1 1-113 and accompanying text.
125. See Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736.
126. Id.
127. 134 N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1975).
Journal of Legislation
spouse had contributed to a pension plan. Similarly, in Schafer v.
Schafer,'28 a Wisconsin court, finding Mr. Schafer had contributed to
his retirement fund, ruled that although his interest at the time of the
divorce had no recognizable cash surrender value 29 unless he retired,
the fund had intrinsic value since it provided future financial secur-
ity. 3 ' Thus, although the fund had no market value, the pension was
includable in the marital asset pool."'3 In all of these cases, the conclu-
sion that participation in a pension plan created a property right pref-
aced the courts' presumption that part of the property created during
the marriage was marital property and properly subject to the states'
equity division rule.
In community property states, pension benefits are generally divisi-
ble upon divorce.' 32 This position has evolved from the rejection of
pension benefits as gifts or gratuities (which are clearly considered ex-
pectancies) and an acceptance of the notion that pension benefits are
deferred compensation for labor services. 133 Again, the courts return to
the question of whether this compensation is property.'34 Here, the
courts have focused their inquiry on defining thepoint in time at which
compensation becomes a contingent property interest rather than a
mere expectancy. The courts often appear to base these timing deci-
sions on distinctions between matured payable benefits, unmatured
vested benefits, or unmatured unvested benefits at the inception of
employment. 35
A series of California cases emphasizes that pension rights are prop-
erty and, therefore, are divisible if the employed spouse has some cer-
tainty of receiving the benefits or recovering the funds. The California
Supreme Court ruled in French v. French 136 that while pensions are
128. 3 Wis. 2d 166, 87 N.W.2d 803 (1958).
129. "Cash surrender value" is the amount available as cash upon voluntary termination of an
insurance or annuity policy.
130. 3 Wis. 2d at 169, 87 N.W.2d at 806 (1958).
131. The Wisconsin courts recognized that including pension rights created difficulties and began
detailing the process of valuation of benefits in a series of cases which include: Leighton v.
Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978); Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267
N.W.2d 235 (1978); Selchert v. Selchert, 90 Wis. 2d 1, 280 N.W.2d 293 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
See also a recent Michigan case in which the court of appeals ruled that an interest in a
noncontributory pension plan constitutes a divisible marital asset even if the actual receipt of
benefits is contingent on the employee-spouse's attaining a specific age. Boyd v. Boyd, 116
Mich. App. 774, 323 N.W.2d 553 (1982).
132. 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065, 4094.
133. Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923); Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal. 2d 180, 265
P.2d 884 (1954); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573, 521 P.2d 736 (1973).
134. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), the Court stated that to consider an
interest in a benefit as property for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, a person must demon-
strate more than need or mere expectation of receipt. A person must have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement." 408 U.S. at 577.
135. Matured benefits are those which the insured employee is currently entitled to receive either
by voluntarily terminating employment or by reaching a prescribed age or length of service.
Vested benefits are those to which the insured employee has obtained an ultimate and irrevo-
cable right to receive as a result of having met certain age and/or length-of-service employ-
ment requirements. Payment of vested benefits need not necessarily begin at the time of
vesting, but rather occurs when retirement is effected.
136. 17 Cal. 2d at 778, 112 P.2d at 237 (1941).
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contractual, they are "mere expectancies" until the employee meets all
contingent requirements of the fund.'37  Later, in In re Marriage of
Brown,' 138 the court reversed its position, holding that pensions are a
form of deferred compensation and that contractual rights in the pen-
sion are created at the time of employment. Thus, pensions represent
an enforceable right even though possession or enjoyment of the con-
tingent interest is at a future date. Since Brown moved the date at
which pension benefits became a contractual right from the point of
vesting established in French to the time of employment, unvested pen-
sion funds could no longer be classified as an expectancy. "Vesting" of
rights occurs upon performance of an employment contract and is no
longer related to the definitions of vesting provided by the Early Re-
tirement Income Security Act. 13 9 While courts of several states have
followed the reasoning of Brown, 4 ' others have declined to do so, re-
taining the vested/unvested distinction in determining the divisibility
of pension rights.1 4'
While courts in community property states commonly agree that
pensions are a property right, 142 generally only property accumulated
during the marriage is considered community property. 143 Therefore,
if pension participation began prior to marriage and continued
throughout, the pension is separate property. To the extent that marital
resources were used to purchase rights or to fund the separate property
(the continued pension participation during marriage), the recipient
must reimburse the community asset pool for marital contributions
made to the pension.
A review of rulings involving military pensions in community prop-
erty states indicates that courts have not distinguished military retire-
ment payments from other pension plans.'" For instance, in both
137. Id. See also Shaver v. Shaver, 107 Cal. App. 3d 788, 165 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1980) in which the
court of appeals held that a wife was not entitled to pension benefits which had not vested at
the time of the dissolution, 1967. Moreover, even though she would have qualified after
1976, she could not seek her share later. See also Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App.
2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962) which stressed the element of certainty of benefits received.
138. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
140. See Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d
661 (Tex. 1976); Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); In re Marriage
of Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679, 566 P.2d 249, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1977).
141. See Beggs v. Beggs, 479 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Koontz v. Koontz, 101 Idaho 51,
607 P.2d 1325 (1980).
142. 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065 at 4094.
143. The exceptions are Louisiana and Texas, where the determination of whether pensions are
separate or community property is made solely by the date of the original asset acquisition.
McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). The issue of whether title
begins at the point of initial contribution or at vesting becomes important. See, e.g., Wil-
liamson v. Williamson, 457 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) which held that vesting oc-
curred during the marriage so that property belonged to the community. See also Herring v.
Blakely, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
144. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 825,reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974), overruled on other grounds by In re
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976) in which the
Supreme Court of California ruled that the principle that retirement benefits are community
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Texas'45 and Washington, 146 courts have ruled that military pensions
are earned property rights, not gifts or gratuities.
Regarding the issue of expectation versus property, the Washington
Supreme Court, prior to the Brown 147 decision, held in Wilder v. Wil-
der 148 that the employee's "vested" right in military pension payments
accrued from the time payment of benefits was certain. Wilder also
held that whether the expectancy of a pension should be taken into
account in property settlement depends on the probability that the em-
ployee will eventually enjoy the pension, and that this determination
should be made on a case-by-case basis rather than under a blanket
rule of expectancy. 149 Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court in
Payne v. Payne 5 0 ruled that a husband's military pension was an
"earned property right that accrues by reason of a specified number of
years of service in a particular branch of the armed services.""'' Since
the husband was entitled to receive the pension one year from the date
of divorce, it was subject to division.'52
In several cases, a military pension lacking some of the aspects of
property was held not to invalidate the community property concept.
In In re Marriage of Karlin,153 the fact that the Federal Government
could increase, diminish, or abolish the plan did not make the retire-
ment plan a gratuity as to rights earned during the governing statute's
effective life. t54 In Mora v. Mora,'"I the court declared that a service
member's death or dishonorable discharge before retirement did not
reduce his interest in retirement benefits to a mere expectancy. Finally,
in In re the Marriage of Fithian,56 the California Supreme Court ruled
that whether an employee is required to make contributions to a retire-
ment fund is irrelevant to the recognition of pension rights as commu-
nity property.
Prior to McCarty, the remaining issue with respect to military pen-
sions had been whether states had a right to apply their divorce law to a
service member's Federal military retirement pay, or whether such an
application conflicted with accomplishing congressionally established
goals."' In Kittleson v. Kittleson t 5 the Washington Appellate Court
property was not affected by whether the source of retirement funds was derived from a state,
federal, military, or private employment relationship.
145. Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
146. Morris v. Morris, 69 Wash. 2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966).
147. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976).
148. 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975).
149. Id. at 367, 534 P.2d at 1358.
150. 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973).
151. Id. at 575, 512 P.2d at 738.
152. Id.
153. 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972).
154. But see cases cited supra note 119.
155. 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
156. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
157. See Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1949) where the Supreme Court held that under the
Supremacy Clause, and given the specific language of the National Service Life Insurance
Act, and construed in light of congressional intent, a service member had an absolute right to
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held that a wife's award of a share of her husband's military pension
was within the jurisdiction of the court and did not present a conflict
with Federal law.
The issue of compatibility or conflict of state and Federal law was
specifically addressed in both McCarty5 9 and the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act.' 6 ° As a result of the Act, divisibility
of military retirement pay as a part of a property settlement is once
again a state issue 16 ' and states may make no distinction between mili-
tary retirement benefits and other pension benefits. A review has re-
vealed that in some states, these pension benefits will not be included in
the marital asset pool subject to division for any of the following rea-
sons: (1) the state treats such benefits as expectancies;162 (2) the state
regards them as separate property; 63 or (3) the state courts hold that a
division threatens the individual's ability to make alimony or child sup-
port payments.' 6 ' Other equity states, 65 using similar criteria for dis-
tinguishing expectancies from property, recognize retirement benefits
as property earned during the marriage and, therefore, subject the pen-
sions to division. 66 All community property states recognize pension
benefits earned during marriage as divisible.
67
SOME ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
An important although subtle effect of both McCarty and the Act
lies in the indirect impact that diverse property and division rules may
have on current family saving patterns. Pension participation repre-
sents a major and growing share of family savings. In 1981, at least
fifty million workers, over half of the full-time civilian labor force,
were enrolled in at least one retirement plan other than Social Secur-
ity. 68 Not only has workers' coverage expanded, but savings of this
nature has grown. In 1977, the Federal Reserve estimated that twenty-
seven percent of all family savings constituted pension participation. 169
Since this estimate included families with no retirement program, the
actual proportion of pension for individuals with pensions could be
choose the beneficiary of his National Service Life Insurance, and therefore community
property states would have to refrain from invoking community property law that would
frustrate the congressional plan. 388 U.S. at 658, 659.
158. 21 Wash. App. 344, 585 P.2d 167 (1978).
159. 453 U.S. at 220.
160. Act, supra note 3.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See discussion supra note 115.
166. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
168. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1981 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 49 (1981).
169. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND
STATISTICS, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS, IST QUARTER 1980 at I 80.
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much higher. Thus, military families are likely to rely heavily on their
pension program as a savings mechanism.
For years, economists have debated whether Social Security and
private pension plans reduce an individual's rate of voluntary savings
and encourage early retirement.' 7° They note that saving transfers re-
sources from employment years to retirement years. Pension annuities
reduce the risk of outliving one's assets during retirement, thereby re-
ducing uncertainty. It is possible that savings patterns of families par-
ticipating in a pension program are smaller than the savings of families
who do not participate.
Diagram I (see Appendix) illustrates the impact of pensions and the
variety of property division rules upon asset distribution to the hus-
band and wife at the time of divorce. For ease of exposition, the illus-
tration traces the situation of one family under various assumptions.
On divorce, the husband and wife each receive a share of the marital
assets in accordance with the state's division rule. The wife's share is
depicted by the shaded area."7 ' Although the diagram approximates a
fifty-fifty split, other applicable division rules could apply. If empirical
evidence concerning the effect of pensions on savings is correct, the
same family will face less uncertainty with respect to future retirement
income if it participates in a pension plan. Consequently, its total pri-
vate savings will be less.
McCarty removed military pensions from those marital assets sub-
ject to division. Block B therefore represents the McCarty division
rule. Again, the wife's share of the assets is represented by the shaded
area of block B. After the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protec-
tion Act was passed, military pensions became divisible in states that
recognize a spouse's participation in a retirement program as marital
property. Therefore, block B now represents the asset division in states
not recognizing pensions as property, or in states that recognize it as the
service member's separate property. Block C illustrates the division for
170. The direction of the economic impact of private pensions on savings is not clear. Theoreti-
cally, in life-cycle models of saving and consumption which are analyzed in a world of cer-
tainty, perfect labor and capital markets, and absent any taxes, an increase in pension
savings would be offset by a decrease in other private savings. In fact, deferred pension
benefits receive favorable income tax treatment. Imperfect capital markets and institutional
constraints in the financial structure of pension plans make it difficult for individuals to
borrow against their future benefits. Uncertainty exists about the real value of future benefits
and the length of time one will live past retirement. These market imperfections and uncer-
tainties operate both to encourage greater savings (tax benefits, uncertainty of lifespan, or
underestimating future real benefits) or depressing savings (illiquidity of capital markets,
overestimating future benefits). Empirical evidence seems to suggest that, on balance, the
presence of pensions reduces other private savings, reduces lifetime savings, or induces ear-
lier retirement. A. BLINDER, R. GORDON AND D. WISE, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EF-
FECTS OF PENSIONS AND THE SAVING AND LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS OF OLDER MEN.
(1981); A. MUNNELL, THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON PERSONAL SAVINGS, ch. 5
(1974); M. FELDSTEIN, Do PRIVATE PENSIONS INCREASE NATIONAL SAVINGS? (Harvard
Institute of Economic Research, Discussion on Paper No. 553, 1977).
171. Assume, for purposes of this example, that the husband is the wage earner and pension
holder.
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states that include the value of pensions in marital property subject to
division. From this simplified example, it is clear that the Act effec-
tively causes each spouse's share of total assets to be divided quite dif-
ferently, depending on the couple's residence at the time of divorce.
Given the substantial difference in asset distribution resulting from
diverse state rules, it is appropriate to consider the number of persons
subject to divisions illustrated by blocks B and C. No specific data on
divorce in military families either in the aggregate or by state of resi-
dence is available. Therefore, one can only approximate the impact by
studying the state of residence of all military families, not just families
involved in a divorce. The Act potentially affects both retired and ac-
tive personnel and their spouses depending on their state of residence
when the dissolution petition is filed. One can determine the retired
service member's residence from studying retirement payments by state
as illustrated by the flow of funds accounts.172 A review of these ac-
counts reveals that in 1980 fifty percent of military retirement pay173
went to California, Florida, Texas and Virginia.174 California and
Texas are community property states. 75 California divides assets
equally,176 while Texas divides assets equitably if the pension is recog-
nized as marital property, and otherwise "reimburses" the marital es-
tate for any contributions to the service member's separate property.'77
Florida and Virginia are recent equitable distribution states, and have
not yet addressed the question of divisibility of military retirement
pay. 178
In addition to the 1,300,000 persons already retired, another
2,050,000 people who are presently serving on active duty are earning
credit toward military retirement. 179 As McCarty noted, active-duty
personnel are assigned to duty stations and generally do not elect their
own state of residence.180 In 1981, almost twenty-five percent of these
active-duty service members were stationed in California and Texas,
where military retirement pay is recognized as community property.' 8'
From information provided about residences of retired and active-duty
172. See generally supra note 169.
173. In 1980, the total amount of funds paid out as military retirement pay benefits was
$6,522,253,000. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINIS-
TRATION, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS IN SUMMARY, FISCAL YEAR
1980, 2 (1981).
174. Id.
175. D. Freed & H. Foster, supra note 115, at 4065, 4079.
176. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buikema, 139 Cal. App. 3d 689, 188 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1983) (supe-
rior court's equal division of husband's military retirement pension would not be reversed by
retroactive application of McCarty since Congress overruled McCarty).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Stelter, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978) (when community military
retirement benefits are before a divorce court, the court should consider them with all other
property subject to "just and right" division).
178. D. Freed & H. Foster, supra note 115, at 4065, 4080-82.
179. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 362 (1981).
180. 453 U.S. at 234.
181. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 179.
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service members, clearly many families will face a block B division,
and others will have a block C division (see Appendix). Thus, while
the state of residence only indicates whether retirement pay is divisible,
this potential for different divisions may cause the family's savings
rates to change significantly after moving.
STATUS OF McCARTY ARGUMENTS
Reviewing the states' varying treatment of pension benefits for pur-
poses of property division, the key divisibility determinants have been:
(1) whether benefits are expectancies or property; (2) if classified as
property, whether the benefits are separate or marital; and (3) whether
such pension benefits are available for division and distribution. Mc-
Carty in many respects summarily dismissed the foregoing factors by
holding that upon divorce, Federal law precludes a state court's divid-
ing military nondisability retirement pay pursuant to community prop-
erty laws. Since the holding in McCarty is based upon federal
preemption, the nondivisibility finding would apply regardless of a
state's division rule. The McCarty Court did not base its decision on
whether such pension is property.18 2 McCarty effectively made the
treatment of military retirement pensions upon divorce equal for all
couples regardless of their state of residence by declaring that no state
could place the pension in the marital asset pool. 83
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act focuses on
creating a different type of equality by treating various pension plans
equally. While not concerned with the possibility of different treatment
between states, the Act's emphasis is on creating equal treatment within
states. In this manner, the Act affirmatively declares military retire-
ment pensions to be property. 8 4 However, the Act does not answer the
question of whether such property should be viewed as separate or
marital property. Instead, the Act leaves this decision to the individual
states. Again, unlike McCarty, the Act clearly states that such pensions
are not necessarily separate property. Lastly, the Act establishes abso-
lutely that at least a portion of the military retirement pay may be dis-
tributed to a former spouse.
A third equal treatment issue is suggested by the military service
members' spouses and, in some respects, combines the equality consid-
erations in both McCart and the Act. Like McCarty, military spouses
favor a pension treatment not dependent on the couple's state of resi-
dence or domicile at a particular time. Unlike the McCarty holding,
however, spouses seek that protection which is only posited as a possi-
182. One might imply from the effect of McCarty that if such pensions were property, they were
the sole property of the service member and are therefore not part of the marital asset pool,
not subject to division and certainly not available for distribution.
183. 453 U.S. at 223.
184. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)).
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bility in the Act - the inclusion of the military retirement pay as a mari-
tal asset subject to division upon divorce.
In particular, military spouses argue that their family responsibility,
which includes moving to new locations, effectively precludes them
from working in one place long enough to satisfy vesting requirements
enumerated in ERISA. I8 5 Consequently, they argue, the military effec-
tively denies them access to a pension in their own names. If imple-
mented, this argument would cause military retirement pensions to be
divisible regardless of the rules applicable to other pensions. Their
proposal would result in consistency among states but inconsistency
among types of pensions.
Despite this argument's appeal, its validity depends upon the exist-
ence of a distinction between the military pension and other types of
pensions. Specifically, one must determine whether sufficient attributes
attach to military pensions so as to cause them to always be considered
divisible marital assets. Generally, military families move more fre-
quently and have less control over location than other families. Often,
they have no say in whether to move at all. However, in light of cur-
rent economic conditions, and increased, albeit not always "voluntary",
mobility for job hunting, the strength of the distinction weakens. Since
property division rules sometimes vary greatly between states, any per-
son or family who chooses to move or is moved by a company is likely
to be subject to different division rules in his new state of residence
than he was in his former state of residence. Military pensions are cer-
tainly not the only asset covered by such rules; thus anyone, whether or
not in the military, is likely to have some type of asset division affected
by his residence in a state at the time of divorce. It seems unlikely that
people choose their residence based upon divorce laws regarding prop-
erty division. However, one could argue that the jurisdictional limita-
tion imposed by the Act which prohibits jurisdiction based solely on a
service member's presence in the state due to military orders, 186 pro-
vides the service member with a choice of forums for divorce purposes.
This choice is not usually available to the general populace.
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act does not
address or does not resolve a number of other issues raised in McCarty.
The Supreme Court in McCarty was concerned in part about the effect
of pension divisibility on a service member's desire to enlist or reen-
list.' 87 If receiving a pension benefit was a major incentive for a mili-
tary person to continue his or her career, providing less than this total
expectation might lessen or destroy any incentive. The Court stressed
the importance of this incentive because of the military's special nature
and its present dependence on a volunteer service. While the Act does
not directly address this concern, the offset provisions indicate that mil-
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)-(d) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
186. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)).
187. 453 U.S. at 234-35.
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itary retirement pay could be diminished for a number of reasons188
other than divisibility in a property settlement. Arguably, the fifty per-
cent provision in the Act greatly reduces a service member's expecta-
tion. However, this is not the only provision which does so. 189 Lastly,
it is impossible to predict whether the divisibility of military retirement
pay provided for in the Act will have such an effect. One can argue
that the potential "horrible" effect which the Court envisions, particu-
larly for reenlistment, is no different than the situation involving a pri-
vate sector employee who knows his pension benefit might be
diminished by divorce and hence chooses to leave his employer before
the pension can vest, thereby denying any portion of the benefit to his
former spouse. Again, the Court based its concern partly on the special
nature of the military, but the distinction seems insufficient to warrant
the McCarty conclusion.
The McCarty Court also suggested that allowing division of mili-
tary retirement pay upon divorce would in effect discriminate against
widows or widowers.' 90 The military retirement pay benefit ceases on
the service member's death. Consequently, a widow or widower, ab-
sent a member's annuity election, would not receive any portion of the
retirement pay following the member's death. Similarly, it should fol-
low that if a divorce decree awards an ex-spouse a portion of the mem-
ber's retirement pay, such payment would cease upon the member's
death. 191 Presumably, McCarty does not address this situation because
neither the widow nor the ex-spouse of the deceased would continue to
receive payment after the member's death.
Instead, the Supreme Court's concern was generated by the situa-
tion where, in effecting a divorce settlement, a court assessed the pres-
ent value of the member's future entitlement to retirement pay. If this
value was then added to the total marital asset pool and the ensuing
award was based upon each party receiving a certain proportion of the
pool but not necessarily a specific asset, 192 then the ex-spouse could
receive more than a current widow. For instance, the McCarty Court
described a case wherein the couple's total assets, including the military
retirement pay, are valued at $60,000 and, further, that the court
awarded the wife a $30,000 house as her share and the husband re-
tained the remaining assets, including sole entitlement to his military
retirement pay. Following the divorce, he remarried and died shortly
thereafter. The widow would not receive part of the husband's retire-
ment pay, absent an SBP annuity if the election were made, but the ex-
spouse would already have received the value of the pay through her
188. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)-(F)).
189. Id.
190. 453 U.S. at 227-28.
191. Indeed, the Act specifically states that payments cease on the member's death. Act, supra
note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(4)).
192. However, in this case, it need not necessarily be an amount paid directly out of the retire-
ment benefit.
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share of the property settlement. 93
The Act, however, does not address this situation. Indeed, any
problem posed by such an inequity may be exacerbated by the Act's
minimum requirement of a ten year marriage as a prerequisite to gar-
nishment. 94 If a marriage is dissolved prior to that ten year period, or
if the member's credible service is less than ten years, a court may still
value the military pension in order to determine the total value of the
couple's asset pool.195 Since division of the pension itself will not be
possible, the court may be more inclined to assign a present value to the
pension and give the nonmember spouse a substitute asset.
However inequitable the division of military pensions seems, unless
widows or widowers of military members are singled out for special
treatment, the division problem suggested above arises in numerous
potential divorce settlements. For instance, assume that a couple's total
marital or community assets are valued at $60,000, which represents
$30,000 of stock and a $30,000 house. Upon divorce, the wife receives
the house and the husband recieves the stock. He later remarries and
sometime before his death the stock drops in value to $5,000. Mean-
while, the house's value escalates to $60,000. Obviously, the husband's
widow (second wife) will receive fewer benefits than the ex-spouse.
As a second example, assume that the couple's total assets prior to
divorce were $60,000, half of which was a house and half a small busi-
ness. He remarries, and the business fails. Again, his widow will re-
ceive less than the ex-spouse. Of course, in either of the foregoing
situations, the economic fate of either spouse could be reversed and
eventually the widow could inherit much more than the ex-spouse. In
all cases, division is a game of chance which is not peculiar to the mili-
tary family. In any event, a second spouse can be protected if the mili-
tary member (or private business person) provides an annuity.
Lastly, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that even if the
divisibility of military retirement pay creates a disparity between an ex-
spouse and a widow or widower, such a disparity is not inherently ineq-
uitable. If the service member's first marriage lasted twenty years and
that time period included a substantial portion of the member's credi-
ble service, and the member dies within a few years of remarriage, it
seems reasonable and equitable to expect the former spouse to receive
more of a return from the retirement pay than the widow or widower.
Indeed, in states which do not consider the military retirement pay as
divisible community property, the ex-spouse will not receive any por-
tion thereof. However, if the service member has elected to provide an
annuity for the second spouse, then the widow or widower will receive
a return on the pension and the former spouse will not, regardless of
length of the member's marriages.
193. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 227-28.
194. Act, supra note 3, § 1002(a) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (d)(2)).
195. Id.
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CONCLUSION
While the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act
leaves a number of issues unanswered, it clearly resolves the McCarty
Court's concern with the absence of a legislative intent regarding the
application of state property and divisibility rules to military retirement
pay. The Act clearly indicates that Congress intended these rules to be
a prerogative of the states, and not the Federal Government or federal
courts. It is therefore consistent with this intention that the Act resolves
neither the issue of retirement pay as separate or marital property, nor
the question of divisibility. States may, on an individual basis, con-
tinue to hold as the Supreme Court did in McCarty, that military re-
tirement benefits are separate property. The Act merely makes this
choice a matter of state law.
The effect of the Act on other nonmilitary pension plans awaits fu-
ture litigation and legislative action. Those favoring the concept of di-
visibility of all pensions are likely to use the Act as an argument for
such distribution. Such an argument might be particularly persuasive
in light of Congress' implicit determination that military pensions need
not be treated differently than other types, in spite of the plethora of
reasons for making such a distinction as suggested by the Supreme
Court in McCarty. This argument may be offered to encourage legisla-
tors, on both the state and federal levels, to specifically provide for pen-
sion division and to influence judicial decisions in areas undefined by
state law. 196
In the final analysis, there is simply no way to accurately measure
or predict the effect that the Act will have on the issues of enlistment,
reenlistment, retirement timing, or provision of annuities. While it
seems unlikely that the possibility of division of retirement pay upon
divorce will be a major decision factor for any of the foregoing reasons,
critics of the Act may prove to be correct. Should disastrous results
follow, it seems reasonable to assume that Congress will affect a legisla-
tive remedy. For the present, the Act is at least potentially a vehicle for
the equitable recognition of the contribution of a service member's
spouse, who may now gain access to some portion of a pension.
196. Indeed, in August, 1982, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed itself on the issue of pension
divisibility. The court ruled that nonmatured pensions were too unpredictable to be divisi-
ble. Pension benefits may now be divided. Kuchta v. Kuchta, 636 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1982).
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Savings of families with no pen-
sion plan.
Husband Wife
APPENDIX
DIAGRAM I
FAMILY SAVINGS AND THE EFFECT OF
STATES' PROPERTY DIVISION RULES
Savings of families with pension
plan not subject to division.
Husband Wife
PENSION
BLOCK B
Savings of families with pension
plan subject to division.
Husband Wife
BLOCK C
BLOCK A
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